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Abstract
In this paper, we assess whether and to what extent ￿nancial activity in the oil
futures markets has contributed to destabilize oil prices in recent years. We de￿ne
a destabilizing ￿nancial shock as a shift in oil prices that is not related to current
and expected fundamentals, and thereby distorts e¢ cient pricing in the oil market.
Using a structural VAR model identi￿ed with sign restrictions, we disentangle this
non-fundamental ￿nancial shock from fundamental shocks to oil supply and demand
to determine their relative importance. We ￿nd that ￿nancial investors in the futures
market can destabilize oil spot prices, although only in the short run. Moreover,
￿nancial activity appears to have exacerbated the volatility in the oil market over the
past decade, particularly in 2007-2008. However, shocks to oil demand and supply
remain the main drivers of oil price swings.
Keywords: Oil price, Speculation, Structural VAR, Sign restrictions.
JEL Classi￿cation : C32, Q41, Q31.5
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Non-technical summary
The massive oil price ￿ uctuations observed in the last few years have stimulated the
debate on the role of ￿nancial activity in the determination of oil prices. The oil futures
market has indeed become increasingly liquid, and the activity of agents that do not deal
with physical oil, the so-called ￿ non-commercials￿ , has greatly increased. This led some to
hypothesize that in￿ ows of ￿nancial investors in the futures market may have pushed oil
prices above the level warranted by fundamental forces of supply and demand, whereas
others argue that the impact of ￿nancial activity on the oil spot market is negligible or
non-existent beyond the very short term.
In this paper, we evaluate the importance of ￿nancial activity in determining the spot
price of oil relative to the role of oil market fundamentals, by relying on a sign-restricted
structural VAR model. We disentangle stabilizing from destabilizing ￿nancial activity in
the oil futures market based on a set of simple theoretical equations that link the oil spot
market to the futures market through a no-arbitrage condition. A destabilizing ￿nan-
cial shock enters this framework by creating a deviation from the no-arbitrage condition,
thereby distorting e¢ cient price formation by driving oil futures prices away from the lev-
els justi￿ed by oil market fundamentals. On the other hand, stabilising ￿nancial activity
is de￿ned as driven by changes in oil supply and demand-side fundamentals. Elaborating
upon the work of Peersman and Van Robays (2009a,b) and Kilian and Murphy (2010) by
explicitly including the futures market in a sign-restricted VAR, we identify four di⁄erent
types of oil shocks: an oil supply shock, an oil demand shock driven by economic activ-
ity, an oil-speci￿c demand shock which captures changes in oil demand other than those
caused by economic activity, and a destabilizing ￿nancial shock.
Our results suggest that ￿nancial activity in the futures market can signi￿cantly a⁄ect
oil prices in the spot market, although only in the short run. The destabilizing ￿nancial
shock only explains about 10 percent of the total variability in oil prices, and shocks to
fundamentals are clearly more important over our sample. Indeed, looking at speci￿c
points in time, the gradual run-up in oil prices between 2002 and the summer of 2008
was mainly driven by a series of stronger-than-expected oil demand shocks on the back of
booming economic activity, in combination with an increasingly tight oil supply from mid
2004 on. Strong demand-side growth together with stagnating supply were also the main
driving factors behind the surge in oil prices in 2007-mid 2008, and the drop in oil prices6
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in the second half of 2008 can be mainly explained by a substantial fallback in economic
activity following the ￿nancial crisis and the associated decline in global oil demand. Since
the beginning of 2009, rising oil demand on the back of a recovering global economy also
drove most of the recovery in oil prices.
However, we ￿nd that ￿nancial investors did cause oil prices to signi￿cantly diverge
from the level justi￿ed by oil supply and demand at speci￿c points in time. In general,
ine¢ cient ￿nancial activity in the futures market pushed oil prices about 15 percent above
the level justi￿ed by (current and expected) oil fundamentals over the period 2000-mid
2008, when the volume of crude oil derivatives traded on NYMEX quintupled. Particularly
in 2007-2008, destabilizing ￿nancial shocks aggravated the volatility present in the oil
market and caused oil prices to respectively over- and undershoot their fundamental values
by signi￿cant amounts, although oil fundamentals clearly remain more important.7
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1 Introduction
The massive oil price ￿ uctuations observed in the last few years led many commentators
to reexamine the functioning of the price-setting mechanism in the oil market (Khan 2009,
Kaufmann and Ullman 2009, Miller and Ratti 2009 and Lombardi and Mannucci 2011).1
The increasing ￿nancialization of the oil futures markets was blamed by some as the main
driver of the escalation of oil prices, in addition to the more conventional explanations
of surging demand and tight oil supply. It is indeed true that the oil futures market
has become increasingly liquid, and the activity of agents that do not deal with physical
oil, the so-called ￿ non-commercials￿ , has greatly increased. Furthermore, passive index
funds, whose goal is to provide investors with long-only exposure to oil, have witnessed
substantial in￿ ows in recent years (CFTC 2008). This led some to hypothesize that such
in￿ ows in the futures market may have pushed oil prices above the level warranted by
fundamental forces of supply and demand.
Using a sign-restricted structural VAR model, this paper evaluates the importance of
￿nancial activity in determining the spot price of oil relative to the role of oil market
fundamentals. Our identi￿cation scheme is based on a set of simple theoretical equations
that link the oil spot market to the futures market through a no-arbitrage condition.
A destabilizing ￿nancial shock enters this framework by creating a deviation from the
no-arbitrage condition, thereby distorting e¢ cient price formation by driving oil futures
prices away from the levels justi￿ed by oil market fundamentals. This way, we separate
stabilizing from destabilizing ￿nancial activity in the oil futures market.
Our results suggest that ￿nancial activity in the futures market can signi￿cantly desta-
bilize oil prices in the spot market, although only in the short run. In contrast, fundamental
shocks to oil supply and oil demand cause oil prices to shift permanently. Over di⁄erent
forecast horizons, the destabilizing ￿nancial shock only explains about 10 percent of the
total variability in oil prices, as shocks to fundamentals account for about 90 percent of the
forecast error variance decomposition over our sample. Moreover, we ￿nd that ￿nancial
investors did cause oil prices to diverge signi￿cantly from the level justi￿ed by oil supply
and demand at speci￿c points in time over the past decade, particularly in 2007-2009.
1After having surged with increasing momentum to an unprecedented level of USD 120 per barrel in
the summer of 2008, oil prices fell abruptly to reach USD 45 per barrel at the end of 2008 in the wake
of the ￿nancial crisis and the subsequent global economic downturn. Oil prices started rebounding in the
second quarter of 2009 and experienced a strong upturn rising since then.8
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However, innovations to fundamentals still account for most part of recent oil price ￿ uc-
tuations. More speci￿cally, the gradual run-up in oil prices between 2002 and the summer
of 2008 was mainly driven by a series of stronger-than-expected oil demand shocks on the
back of booming economic activity, in combination with an increasingly tight oil supply
from mid 2004 on. Strong demand-side growth together with stagnating supply are also
the main driving factors behind the surge in oil prices in 2007- mid 2008, consistent with
the results in the literature (e.g. Hamilton 2009, Kilian 2009 and related papers). Nev-
ertheless, ￿nancial activity caused oil prices to signi￿cantly overshoot their fundamental
level in the ￿rst half of 2008. This is also true for the second half of 2008, in which oil
prices dropped considerably in the wake of the ￿nancial crisis and the subsequent global
economic downturn. Again, most part of the decline in oil prices was driven by a strong
unexpected drop in global oil demand, but ￿nancial activity caused oil prices to decline
far below the level explained by the reduction in oil demand. The contributions of the
destabilizing ￿nancial shock to the oil price over time can be associated with large ￿ ows in
and out of passive index funds linked to oil. Finally, we ￿nd that rising oil demand on the
back of a recovering global economy drove most of the recent recovery in oil prices since
the beginning of 2009.
This paper relates to di⁄erent strands of the oil literature. First, several studies have
analyzed the e⁄ect of speculation on the oil spot price, mostly using data on trader￿ s
positions in the futures market (IMF 2006, Haigh et al. 2007 and B￿y￿ksahin et al. 2008).
However, the distinction made between speculative activity (i.e. non-commercial trading)
and non-speculative activity (i.e. commercial trading or hedging) may be arbitrary in some
cases, and the publicly available data on speculative trading activity is not completely
representative of all sorts of ￿nancial activity in these futures markets.2 For example, the
above-mentioned index funds only enter on the long side of the crude oil futures market
to hedge. Although the activity of index funds is typically not regarded as speculation, as
they follow a passive investment strategy, the index funds can distort price formation by
causing oil prices to deviate from levels justi￿ed by fundamentals by creating additional
demand in the futures market. This type of ￿nancial activity is not accounted for when
using non-commercial trading data to assess the impact of speculative trading on the oil
price. Moreover, studies that want to evaluate the role of the index funds directly using
trader￿ s position data, also have to rely on rough approximations.3 For this reason, we will
2See Sanders et al. (2004) for a more detailed explanation.
3Irwin and Sanders (2010), for example, proxy index fund positions by swap dealer positions in the9
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assess the impact of ￿nancial activity on oil spot prices without relying on trader position
data. Moreover, we will only evaluate the impact of ￿nancial activity that e⁄ectively
distorts price formation in the oil market, and that can create deviations in the oil price
from the level justi￿ed by oil demand and supply-side fundamentals.
A second strand of related literature examines the e⁄ect of changing oil demand and
supply-side fundamentals on the oil price. In addition to the non-fundamental shock,
we identify shocks to oil market supply and demand-side fundamentals. Most of the
policy and academic literature still ascribes the recent oil price ￿ uctuations to changes
in fundamentals. The gradual rise over the period 2003-2008 is usually explained by
increasing oil demand, and also the oil price run-up of 2007-2008 is mainly attributed to
strong oil demand confronting stagnating global oil production (Hamilton 2009, Kilian
2009 and related papers). Baumeister and Peersman (2008, 2010) observe that the price
elasticities of oil demand and supply have become much smaller over time, leading to
increased oil price sensitivity to similar changes in fundamentals. Anzuini, Lombardi
and Pagano (2010) highlight that expansionary monetary policy may have fueled oil price
increases, but also report that it appears to exert its impact through expectations of higher
in￿ ation and growth, rather than on the ￿ ow of global liquidity into oil futures markets.
By identifying both fundamental and non-fundamental oil shocks, we are able to balance
the importance of fundamentals against that of ine¢ cient ￿nancial activity. Elaborating
upon the work of Peersman and Van Robays (2009a,b) and Kilian and Murphy (2010) by
explicitly including the futures market in a sign-restricted VAR, we identify four di⁄erent
types of oil shocks: an oil supply shock, an oil demand shock driven by economic activity,
an oil-speci￿c demand shock which captures changes in oil demand other than those caused
by economic activity, and a destabilizing ￿nancial shock.
The paper is organized as follows: in the next section we cast a formal de￿nition of
destabilizing ￿nancial activity in a simple theoretical framework. We describe the VAR
model speci￿cation and the identi￿cation strategy in Section 3, and discuss the empirical
results in Section 4; Section 5 concludes.
futures market to evaluate the impact of index funds on commodity futures markets. Although this is a
fair approximation for agricultural commodity markets, this is not the case for energy markets as swap
dealers operating in energy markets only conduct a limited amount of long-only index swap transactions
(CFTC 2008).10
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2 Understanding ￿nancial activity in oil futures markets
In the oil futures markets, we can separate desirable ￿ stabilizing￿from undesirable ￿ desta-
bilizing￿￿nancial activity. The former relates to the fact that agents intervening in the oil
futures market bring their information sets and expectations on future fundamentals into
the pricing mechanism, thereby contributing to the price-discovery mechanism, in addition
to making the markets more liquid. However, if agents place their bets disregarding the
expectations on fundamentals the price-setting mechanism can be distorted. Only this
latter type of ine¢ cient ￿nancial activity matters to policy makers and regulators, and
we will regard this non-fundamental ￿nancial shock in the futures markets as related to
speculative activity. In this section, we shed some light on the concept of destabilizing
￿nancial trading by looking at the functioning of oil futures markets and the link between
the futures and the spot market for crude oil.
2.1 The oil futures market
In the case of commodities, futures markets exist as a means of transferring risks of
price ￿ uctuations. Typically, two main type of traders are identi￿ed to be active in the
oil futures market, i.e. commercial and non-commercial traders. Agents who deal with
physical oil, often labeled as commercials, may wish to hedge against price ￿ uctuations
by ￿xing in advance the price they will have to pay or receive for a delivery in the future.
Oil producers will therefore have the opportunity to secure their income today by selling
futures contracts, and oil consumers will buy futures contracts in order to pin down their
future costs. Yet, agents not dealing with physical oil also participate in the market,
making the oil market more liquid. These non-commercials intervene in oil futures market
because they want to achieve exposure to oil price risk, either on the upside or downside,
to make a pro￿t.
Typically, speculative behavior in the oil market is attributed to the ￿nancial activity
of traders that actively enter the futures market and buy or sell according to (expected)
fundamentals. The CFTC ascribes speculative activity to the non-commercial traders that
make pro￿ts based on their expectations of the future oil supply-demand balance. Without
relying on trader position data, Kilian and Murphy (2010) also de￿ne speculation in the
oil market as related to oil fundamentals, i.e. a speculation shock in their framework is
￿any oil demand shock that re￿ects shifts in expectations about future oil production or11
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future real activity (p.9)￿ .
In reality, however, movements in futures prices do not always re￿ ect e¢ cient pricing of
the expected oil supply-demand balance. For example, agents may intervene in the futures
market not because they have expectations on the future dynamics of oil fundamentals, but
rather because they want to allocate part of their portfolio to oil. There is indeed a good
motivation to do so, as oil futures are commonly thought to be a hedge against in￿ ation,
and to be negatively correlated with stock market indices. Commodity-related index funds
were created to allow investors to easily achieve exposure to commodity price risk, and
accordingly they only enter on the long side of the crude oil futures market, independent on
whether future oil fundamentals are strong or weak. Although they follow a passive trading
strategy, these ￿nancial funds may distort price formation by causing oil prices to deviate
from levels justi￿ed by current or expected fundamentals. The magnitude of the in￿ ows
into such index funds is precisely one of the reasons why many observers attributed for
the recent volatile behavior of oil prices to speculation. This type of speculation, or more
generally ￿nancial activity, is neither captured by looking at non-commercial positions, as
index fund traders are regarded as commercial traders, nor is it speci￿cally captured in
the framework employed by Kilian and Murphy (2010).4
To wrap up, we de￿ne destabilizing ￿nancial trading in oil markets based on identifying
two types of ￿nancial activity in the oil futures market. The ￿rst type occurs on the back
of changing expectations about oil market fundamentals. This does not distort the e¢ cient
functioning of the oil market, but rather enhances the oil price formation mechanism by
bringing in new information on expected fundamentals. Conversely, the second type of
￿nancial activity occurs independently of (current and expected) oil supply and demand
fundamentals, thereby distorting e¢ cient pricing in the futures and spot market by causing
prices to deviate from their levels justi￿ed by fundamentals. We will de￿ne this type of
trading as destabilizing ￿nancial activity. In the next subsection, we will exploit the
theoretical link between the oil spot and futures market to better characterize these two
types of ￿nancial activity.
4The scheme used by Kilian and Murphy (2010) to identify the speculation shock could be consistent
with the way we identify the ine¢ cient ￿nancial shock later on, under the condition that ine¢ cient ￿nancial
trading contemporaneously a⁄ects oil prices and inventories in the spot market. However, our aim is to
focus on non-fundamental futures market shocks and remain agnostic about the impact of destabilizing
￿nancial activity on oil prices and inventory holdings in the spot market, as the exact transmission to the
oil spot market is not explicitly known.12
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2.2 The link between spot and futures prices
Of course, ￿nancial activity in the futures market only matters if changes in futures prices
can a⁄ect oil prices in the spot market. This linkage between the spot and the futures
market for oil is commonly represented by a no-arbitrage condition (Pindyck 1993, Alquist
and Kilian 2010). We will rely on this condition to give a theoretical characterization of
the two types of activity in futures markets, fundamental versus non-fundamental, which
will also prove useful for the identi￿cation of these shocks later on.
Let us consider an investor who holds Pt units of the numeraire at time t. He can
either invest in a risk-free bond with yield rt, or buy oil, store it and sell it on the futures
market for delivery in t + ￿. Buying oil, however, also brings an additional bene￿t, in
that the investor has access to a commodity that he can exploit, if needed. We will label
this bene￿t as the convenience yield, and denote it as ￿t;t+￿ (Pindyck 1993).5 By the
no-arbitrage principle, the two investment strategies should bear the same return. If we
denote the spot price as Pt and the future price Ft;t+￿, we have:
Pt(1 + rt)￿ = Ft;t+￿ + ￿t;t+￿ (1)
Taking logarithms, Equation (1) becomes:
pt + ￿rt = ft;t+￿ +  t;t+￿ (2)
So, if markets are e¢ cient and arbitrage opportunities are exploited instantaneously,
Equation (2) would hold. If the convenience yield, net of storage costs, is positive, this will
imply that spot prices are higher than futures, which explains why the futures curve in
commodities markets is often negatively sloped (backwardation). However, if storage costs
are higher than the convenience yield, it would be possible to observe a positive-sloped
futures curve (contango). Rewriting Equation (2) gives an expression of the futures price
in terms of the spot oil price, the convenience yield and the risk-free rate:
ft;t+￿ = pt ￿  t;t+￿ + ￿rt (3)
Pindyck (1994) postulates a relationship between the convenience yield on the one
hand, and the oil spot price, oil inventories and expected fundamentals on the other:
 t;t+￿ = G[pt;It;E(Dt;t+￿)] (4)
5Here, we abstract from the fact that oil has to be stored and this operation has a price, hence the
convenience yield will be expressed net of storage costs.13
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where It is the level of inventories, E(Dt;t+￿) is the expected demand over period t to
t + ￿ and G denotes a generic function.6 G is increasing in pt, since higher prices imply a
higher convenience in holding inventories, decreasing in It since at times of low inventories
the marginal yield of an additional unit is higher, and increasing in E(Dt;t+￿) since higher
expected demand makes holding inventories more convenient, as future market tightness
is expected. Note that also expected future supply tightness will increase the convenience
yield of holding inventories. Hence, we can assume that the term E(Dt;t+￿) captures the
overall e⁄ect of expected fundamentals on the convenience yield.
Substituting Equation (4) into Equation (3) gives the following:
ft;t+￿ = pt ￿ G[pt;It;E(Dt;t+￿)] + ￿rt (5)
In the e¢ cient, no-arbitrage case, the futures price depends positively on the current
spot price, negatively on expected oil fundamentals and positively on the risk-free rate.
If agents in the economy are homogeneous, they will all have access to the same
information set and process the ￿ ow of news homogeneously, so that Equation (5) will
always hold. More speci￿cally, all other things equal, futures prices will be moved by the
￿ ow of news that changes expectations on future demand and supply, such as an expected
depreciation of the US dollar or other fundamental shocks that can a⁄ect the future oil
supply-demand balance. Based on this news on (expected) fundamentals, agents will place
their bets in both the futures and spot market and thereby change the futures and spot
price according to the no-arbitrage condition, so that it will always hold.
However, and without the need to depart from rationality, players in commodity mar-
kets are indeed not homogeneous. Let us concentrate on the oil futures market, in which
players can participate for other reasons than buying or selling futures based on their
expectations on oil fundamentals. When an index fund receives an in￿ ow by an investor,
e.g. by someone who wants to invest in commodities to hedge against in￿ ation risks, it will
then buy oil futures irrespective of its expectations on the oil supply and demand balance.
Conversely, if an out￿ ow from an index fund materializes, e.g. because an investor needs
to reduce his leverage, the fund will sell oil futures, again irrespective of fundamentals.7
6There is no need to specify the functional form of the function G in more detail, as the identi￿cation
of the di⁄erent types of oil shocks will only depend on the sign of the relationship between the convenience
yield and its deteminants.
7More generally, this reasoning will apply to any agent that places his bets irrespective of fundamentals,
e.g. uninformed noise traders or technical analysts who try to jump on price trends.14
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Such interventions will also a⁄ect the futures price set in the market, thereby generating
a deviation from the fundamental no-arbitrage relationship, so that the observed future
price becomes:
f￿
t;t+￿ = ft;t+￿ + ￿
f
t (6)
with ft;t+￿ the futures price that would prevail if the no-arbitrage condition was always
satis￿ed and the futures price is solely determined by fundamental factors, i.e. the one
found in Equation (5). The term ￿
f
t , which we assume to be weakly stationary, represents
the deviation of the observed future price from its no-arbitrage value. This shock ￿
f
t , which
we will label the destabilizing ￿nancial shock, creates a perturbation in the futures market
in the sense that demand for futures contracts driven by this sort of speculation moves
the observed futures price away from its fundamentally justi￿ed level.8
How can an ine¢ cient perturbation to oil futures prices transmit to oil spot prices?
In the no-arbitrage framework, if expected changes in oil fundamentals move the futures
price, the spot price will be a⁄ected via the inventory channel. This is exactly how Kilian
and Murphy (2010) identify their speculation shock, i.e. as an inventory demand shock in
the spot market. We, however, want to assess the e⁄ect of ￿nancial activity in the futures
market that is not related to fundamentals, and enters our framework as a deviation
of the no-arbitrage equation.9 The exact transmission of this ine¢ cient ￿nancial shock
is thus less well-known. A ￿rst possibility is that arbitrageurs in the spot market will
recognize the perturbation as not linked to expected fundamentals, and hence accumulate
(or dump) inventories to exploit the arbitrage opportunity. In addition to this, other
players in the physical market may instead interpret the price signal as genuinely related
to changing expectations on fundamentals, and hence adjust their supply and demand
8In order for the deviation to persist and hence be observable, we must hypothesize that there are
frictions (e.g. physical constraints) that prevent agents to immediately arbitrage away the misalignment.
In general, we remark that the presence of frictions cannot be interpreted as a source of misalignment in
the pricing equations (i.e. they do not constitue per se a shock), but rather they impact on the absorption
of misalignments (i.e. the speed at which shocks die out).
9As mentioned before, the speculation shock identi￿ed in Kilian and Murphy (2010) could be consistent
with the way we identify the ine¢ cient ￿nancial shock if we impose that the transmission to the spot
market goes through the inventory channel and necessarily a⁄ects the spot price and oil production within
the same month that the shock hits. However, our aim is to model fundamental versus non-fundamental
￿nancial activity in the futures market to assess to which extent ine¢ cient ￿nancial activity transmits to
oil spot prices, whereas Kilian and Murphy (2010) assume complete pass-through from the futures to the
spot market, and therefore do not include the futures price in their model.15
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decisions. Moreover, it could also be that it takes some time for the agents in the spot
market to recognize and interpret this deviation. A priori, it is not exactly known how
a change in the futures price following a destabilizing speculation shock is transmitted
to the spot market, and therefore we remain agnostic on this. More speci￿cally, we will
decide to leave the response of the spot price and oil inventories over to the data in the
empirical part. What we do know is that the destabilizing ￿nancial shock has an impact
on the spread. Let us substitute Equation (5) into Equation (6) to get:
f￿
t;t+￿ = pt ￿ G[pt;It;E(Dt;t+￿)] + ￿rt + ￿
f
t (7)
According to Equation (7), the observed futures price is a function of the spot price,
current and expected changes related to fundamentals and the destabilizing ￿nancial shock.
So, futures are allowed to vary based current or expected changes to oil supply and demand
as well as for destabilizing speculation in the futures market. Hence, Equation (7) captures
the two types of activity in oil futures markets de￿ned above in Section 2.1.












t;t+￿ is the observed futures-spot spread between t and t+￿. This equation ex-
presses the spread in terms of a fundamental component (1) and a component (2) that takes
into account destabilizing ￿nancial activity and the chance that prices may be misaligned
with respect to the level warranted by (current and expected) fundamentals. Assuming
that storage costs are constant, changes in (expected) fundamentals will negatively a⁄ect
the spread, whereas the destabilizing ￿nancial shocks will have a positive impact, since it
increases observed futures prices via Equation (6). The fact that the futures-spot spread
reacts di⁄erently to the two di⁄erent kinds of activity in the futures market (i.e. trading
based on fundamentals and destabilizing ￿nancial activity) will prove useful to uniquely
identify these shocks and their importance later on.10 For example, suppose that the ex-
10Note that although the risk free rate is part of the fundamental component, it positively a⁄ects the
spread and therefore could be wrongly identi￿ed as part of the destabilizing ￿nancial shock. However,
as long as interest rates are at low levels, and we look at short maturities, this should not matter much.
Indeed, based on our results, the correlation between the structural ￿nancial shock and the risk-free interest
rate, proxied by the Federal Funds rate, is only 0.01 and insigni￿cant, which indicates that we are not
con￿using ine¢ cient ￿nancial shocks for shocks to the interest rate.16
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pected oil supply-demand balance becomes tighter because of unrest in the Middle-East,
then both the futures and the spot price will increase to satisfy the no-arbitrage condition,
but as the convenience yield will rise as well, the increase in the spot price should be more
pronounced than the rise in the futures prices so that the futures-spot spread declines.
On the other hand, when an in￿ ow in an index fund pushes the futures price upwards,
the spot price might increase as well, but not by more than the futures price. If expected
fundamentals do not change after the destabilizing ￿nancial shock but inventory holdings
possibly increase, then the convenience yield will decline. In turn, this decrease in the
convenience yield will counteract a possible decline in the spread as spot prices increase -
cfr. Equation (8).
3 Model speci￿cation and identi￿cation
Although the importance of ￿nancial activity in determining oil price ￿ uctuations is still
strongly debated, it is common knowledge that, at least in the long run, oil ￿ uctuations
are mainly driven by changes in oil supply and demand. In order to get a comprehensive
view on the determinants of oil prices, we will identify oil price movements that are driven
by conventional oil supply and demand shocks in addition to those related to destabilizing
￿nancial activity.
3.1 A structural VAR model
To evaluate the role of the di⁄erent types of shocks in determining the oil price, we
employ a structural vector autoregression (SVAR) framework that has the following general
representation:
Xt = c + A(L)Xt￿1 + B"t
The vector of endogenous variables Xt captures the global dynamics in the oil spot and
futures market by including world oil production (Qoil), the price of crude oil expressed
in US dollars (Poil), a measure of world economic activity (Yw), the futures price of oil
(Foil) and oil inventories (It). To avoid redundant variables, we do not include the spread
(st;t+￿) in the model, but generate the response as the di⁄erence between the estimated
level response of the futures and spot price of oil. c is a vector of constants, A(L) is a
matrix polynomial in the lag operator L and B is the contemporaneous impact matrix17
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of the vector of orthogonalized error terms "t. The oil price is the nominal Brent crude
oil spot price and the futures-spot spread is based on the associated 3-month futures
contracts. Although the Brent futures market is somewhat thinner than the WTI market,
we use the Brent oil price as a global benchmark for the reason that WTI oil is mainly
used in the US, whereas the Brent is used to specify two-thirds of crude oil exchanged
world-wide on the ICE futures exchange.11 We proxy global economic activity by the
OECD measure of global industrial production, which covers the OECD countries and the
six major non-OECD economies, including e.g. China and India. Following Kilian and
Murphy (2010), we proxy global crude oil inventories as total US crude oil inventories,
scaled by the ratio of OECD petroleum stocks over US petroleum stocks. The VAR model
is estimated using monthly data over the sample period 1991:01-2010:02, and we include
12 lags of the endogenous variables.12 All the variables are transformed to monthly growth
rates by taking the ￿rst di⁄erence of the natural logarithm, and the variables are corrected
for seasonality. In general, the results are quite robust to di⁄erent speci￿cations of the
variables and the SVAR model, see the discussion in Section 4.4.
3.2 Identi￿cation of di⁄erent types of oil shocks
The recent literature has clearly shown that di⁄erent factors can drive oil price movements,
and that the economic consequences crucially depend on the underlying source of the oil
price change (Kilian 2009 and related papers, Peersman and Van Robays 2009a,b). We
identify four di⁄erent types of shocks: an oil supply shock, an oil demand shock driven
by economic activity, an oil-speci￿c demand shock (i.e. the fundamental shocks), and a
destabilizing ￿nancial shock (i.e. the non-fundamental shock). We do this by relying on
the following set of sign restrictions:13
11Moreover, the Brent price is gaining momentum as a global benchmark as recent movements in the
WTI crude oil price were mainly re￿ ecting regional surplus inventory capacity in Cushing, Oklahoma,
instead of pricing in the increased market tightness following unrest in the Middle-East.
12Although lag selection criteria propose to only include 2 or 3 lags, we decide to include one year of lags;
this is required to allow for enough dynamics in the macroeconomic variables following an oil shock, see
Hamilton and Hererra (2004). The start of the sample period is determined by the availabilty of futures
price data.
13The sign restrictions are shown for oil shocks that increase the oil futures price. A more detailed
explanation on the use of sign restrictions can be found in the appendix.18
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STRUCTURAL SHOCKS Qoil Poil Yw It Foil st;t+￿
Non-fundamental shocks
Destabilizing ￿nancial activity ￿ 0 ￿ 0
Fundamental shocks
Oil supply ￿ 0 ￿ 0 ￿ 0 ￿ 0 ￿ 0
Oil demand driven by economic activity ￿ 0 ￿ 0 ￿ 0 ￿ 0 ￿ 0
Oil -speci￿c demand ￿ 0 ￿ 0 ￿ 0 ￿ 0 ￿ 0
First, we disentangle the fundamental oil shocks from the non-fundamental ￿nancial
shocks. We do this by imposing opposite signs on the response of the spread, based on
Equation (8). The fundamental shocks which increase oil prices have a negative e⁄ect
on the futures-spot spread, whereas destabilizing ￿nancial activity increases the spread
after increasing the futures price of oil.14 Hence, we de￿ne the destabilizing ￿nancial
shock as a shock to the futures markets that raises the oil futures price and increases the
futures-spot spread. This could for example re￿ ect the trading behavior of index funds
that enter the oil futures market to provide a hedge against in￿ ation, irrespective of oil
market fundamentals. Note that we do not restrict any of the responses in the oil spot
market following a destabilizing ￿nancial shock, as the e⁄ect on the oil spot market and
the exact transmission mechanism is a priori unknown.
Second, we further disentangle the fundamental shocks into shocks caused by shifting
oil demand and oil supply. Following Baumeister and Peersman (2010) and Peersman
and Van Robays (2009a,b), we disentangle the fundamental oil supply and oil demand
shocks by relying on a set of signs derived from a simple supply-demand scheme of the
oil market. Shocks on the supply side of the oil market shift the oil supply curve and
therefore move oil prices and oil production in opposite directions. Shocks on the demand
side of the oil market shift the oil demand curve and therefore cause oil prices and oil
production to move in the same direction. More speci￿cally, an unfavorable oil supply
shock is an exogenous shift of the oil supply curve to the left which lowers oil production
and increases oil prices, whilst world industrial production does not increase. Exogenous
14In order to disentangle the fundamental versus the non-fundamental shocks, we only look at the change
in the spread, i.e. the di⁄erence between the change in the level of the futures price and the change in
the level of the oil spot price. The restriction imposed on the spread does thus not imply that the market
should be in contango or backwardation.19
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oil production disruptions caused by geopolitical tensions in the Middle-East are a natural
example. Consistent with the no-arbitrage condition, oil futures prices will increase after
this shock, but less than proportionally, so that the futures-spot spread declines. This is
because the convenience yield will also be higher after the increase in oil spot prices driven
by the oil supply shock.
In contrast, a favorable oil demand shock driven by global economic activity and the
accompanying rise in overall commodity demand will increase both oil production and
oil prices as this shock is represented by an upward shift of the oil demand curve. By
de￿nition, such shocks are associated with an increase in global economic activity. A
natural example of this type of shock is the surge in oil demand on the back of strong
economic growth in emerging economies such as China and India. Again, to satisfy the
no-arbitrage condition, the futures price will increase and the futures-spot spread will
decline.
Finally, an unfavorable oil-speci￿c demand shock is a demand shock for oil which is not
driven by stronger economic growth. This shock also raises oil prices and oil production,
but is associated with a negative, or rather non-positive, e⁄ect on economic activity. As
this oil price increase is also driven by fundamentals, the futures price will increase and
the spread will decline according to the no-arbitrage condition. Two examples of this are
an oil substitution shock and an expected oil fundamentals shock. Rising demand for oil
caused by increased substitution of coal for oil will drive up the price of oil, increase oil
production and will not be favorable for economic activity because of the higher oil price.
On the other hand, an expected fundamental shock, e.g. tighter expected oil supply or
demand, will raise oil demand due to an increased demand for oil inventories. This will
increase both the oil price and production, and will not stimulate economic activity as
oil prices are higher. However, we do not restrict the response of inventories following
the oil-speci￿c shock to capture a broader set of oil-speci￿c demand shocks beyond these
expected fundamental shocks.
Kilian and Murphy (2010), in contrast, separately identify an expected oil fundamental
shock in their SVAR model identi￿ed with sign restrictions. Their expected fundamental
shock is characterized as an oil inventory demand shock, which increases oil inventories,
the oil price and production, and decreases world economic activity. As mentioned before,
they interpret this expected fundamentals shock as a speculation shock. We, however,
focus on ￿nancial activity that is actually detrimental for the functioning of the oil futures20
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market, i.e. all the trading activity in the futures market that can not be related to
(expected) fundamentals. In our framework, we consider the expected oil fundamental
shock of Kilian and Murphy (2010) as one that still re￿ ects e¢ cient market functioning,
and is part of the more general fundamental oil-speci￿c demand shock.
As we only identify four oil shocks using a ￿ve-variable SVAR model, a residual shock
will capture all the structural shocks not accounted for. This residual shock has no di-
rect economic interpretation, and based on the results described in the next section, its
importance in explaining oil spot and futures prices appears to be small.
4 Empirical results
4.1 E⁄ects of di⁄erent types of oil shocks
Figure 1 shows the estimated 68% con￿dence bands of the impulse response functions to
the di⁄erent types of oil shocks. The estimated responses are shown in levels up to 60
months after the shock, and the oil shocks have been normalized to contemporaneously
increase the oil price by 10%. We ￿nd it convenient to also show the estimated median
response as a possible summary measure, even though the median responses are prone to
some criticism and should therefore be interpreted with caution (see Fry and Pagan 2010
for more details).15
Similar to Kilian (2009) and Peersman and Van Robays (2009a,b), we ￿nd that the
e⁄ects of an oil price increase crucially depend on the underlying source of the increase.
First, the exogenous oil supply shock causes oil production to decline and oil prices to
increase permanently. A temporarily lower level of inventories partially counterbalances
the fall in oil supply, although not signi￿cantly, and the oil supply shock signi￿cantly
reduces the level of economic activity. The dynamics of the response of the oil futures
price is very similar to those of the oil price in the spot market, although the futures price
increases by less so that the spread declines. This decline is only temporary, indicating
that following the oil supply shock, the slope of the oil futures curve does not signi￿cantly
change in the somewhat longer term. Second, the permanent oil price increase caused by
a shock in oil demand driven by economic activity is associated with an increase in oil
15The results based on the 68% range are instead not subject to this critique as they describe a range
of possible outcomes.21
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production and a positive e⁄ect on industrial production, which is not surprising given
that this shock is identi￿ed as an aggregate demand shock that boosts demand for oil. Oil
inventories tend to lower temporarily to partially address the increased demand for oil,
although this decline is not signi￿cant. Again, the response of the oil futures price is very
similar to the one of the spot price, and the spread temporarily declines. Third, the oil-
speci￿c demand shock also causes oil spot prices to be permanently higher. The increased
demand for oil raises oil production and has a negative e⁄ect on the level of economic
activity. Oil inventories do not respond signi￿cantly, which is probably due to the fact
that this shock captures a wide variety of oil-speci￿c demand shocks with diverging e⁄ects
on inventories.16 The spread again only declines in the short-run.
Interestingly, not only the fundamental shocks, but also the destabilizing ￿nancial
shock a⁄ects oil spot prices signi￿cantly. As expected, this e⁄ect on the oil spot price is
only short-lived, in contrast to the oil price responses following the fundamental shocks
which are permanent. The pass-through of the destabilizing ￿nancial shock in futures
prices to the spot market price for oil is incomplete, and the futures-spot spread increases
permanently.17 We do not ￿nd a signi￿cant reaction of oil production or oil inventories, nor
do we ￿nd that destabilizing ￿nancial activity has real economic e⁄ects.18 The insigni￿cant
response of oil inventories is interesting given the current discussion in the literature on the
relationship between inventories and speculation. Much of the anecdotal evidence against
a role of speculation is that during the past few years, there was no noticeable increase
in inventories (e.g. Irwin and Sanders 2010). However, using a simple theoretical model,
Hamilton (2009) shows that speculation can a⁄ect spot oil prices without triggering a
signi￿cant rise in inventories as long as the price elasticity of oil demand is small. We
￿nd that ￿nancial activity is indeed not necessarily associated with a signi￿cant change in
16For example, an expected fundamental shock is likely to increase inventories as agents in the physical
market want to anticipate the future oil price increase, and a substitution shock is more likely to decrease
oil inventories because of the unexpected increase in oil demand.
17This implies that it is necessary to include futures market variables in the model when assessing the
role of speculation, since relying on a full pass-through of futures price shocks to oil spot prices via the
no-arbitrage condition is empirically not correct. Therefore, the assumption made by Kilian and Murphy
(2010) to not explicitly model the oil futures market when assessing the role of speculation, and only use
spot oil market variables in their SVAR, is restrictive.
18The insigni￿cant response of production can not be conclusive on the validity of the Hotelling principle,
which argues that oil producers have the tendency to keep oil production in the ground as futures prices
are higher than spot prices. We would expect this e⁄ect to play only when the market is in contango, i.e.
spot prices are lower than futures prices.22
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inventories but can still a⁄ect the spot price of oil, if speculation is de￿ned as ine¢ cient
trading in the futures market.19
4.2 Relevance of di⁄erent types of oil shocks
The impulse response analysis shows that destabilizing ￿nancial activity in the futures
markets can matter as it signi￿cantly a⁄ects spot oil prices. The forecast error variance
decomposition will shed some light on the overall importance of destabilizing ￿nancial
trading for explaining the variability of oil spot prices over our sample, relative to the
fundamental shocks. Figure 2 shows this forecast error decomposition of the oil spot price
and the oil futures price. The variance decompositions are obtained using the posterior
median draw.20
The left-hand side of Figure 2 displays the forecast error variance decomposition of
the oil spot price. It is clear that the largest part of oil price ￿ uctuations over our sample
are explained by shocks to fundamentals. Over the di⁄erent forecast horizons, more than
90 percent of the forecast error is attributable to fundamental shocks in oil demand and
supply. Not surprisingly, oil demand shocks driven by economic activity account for most
part of this contribution, explaining more than 40 percent of the forecast error variance.
Shocks to oil supply account for about 30 percent of the forecast error in the short run,
which however declines in the longer run. Clearly, this implies that the importance of
non-fundamental ￿nancial shocks is rather limited. Over the di⁄erent forecast horizons,
the destabilizing ￿nancial shocks accounts for about 10 percent of the forecast error de-
composition on average. Although this contribution is very limited relative to those of the
fundamental shocks, ine¢ cient trading can account for a non-negligible part of oil price
variability.
The right-hand side of Figure 2 shows the forecast error decomposition of the futures
price. Destabilizing ￿nancial activity plays a signi￿cantly larger role in explaining futures
price movements, contributing more than 20 percent to the forecast errors at very short
19In their SVAR, Kilian and Murphy (2010) limit the response of inventories following their speculation
shock by restricting the magnitude of the price elasticity of oil demand, in order to be consistent with the
theoretical results of Hamilton￿ s (2009) model on speculation. This is rather counterintuitive since they
actually de￿ne a speculation shock as an oil inventory shock in the spot market. By de￿ning speculation
di⁄erently, i.e. an ine¢ ciency shock in the futures market, we do not need to impose this restriction.
20We refer to Section 4.4 for robustness checks on alternative choices of this speci￿c draw. The forecast
error decompositions of the other variables in the SVAR model are available on request.23
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horizons. This contribution declines somewhat at longer horizons, reaching 16 percent in
the long run. Indeed, futures price variability is also for most part explained by shocks
to (expected) fundamentals, and by oil demand shocks driven by economic activity in
particular. The smaller contribution of the destabilizing ￿nancial shock in the spot market
indicates that not all ine¢ cient trading in the oil futures markets is passed on to the oil
spot market, which is consistent with the incomplete pass-through of the destabilizing
￿nancial shock to oil spot prices found in the impulse response analysis. Finally, note
that the contribution of the non-identi￿ed residual shock is very small in the short run,
implying that the four shocks identi￿ed in our framework capture almost the entire short-
run forecast error variability of oil spot and futures prices over our sample.
4.3 Explaining recent oil price ￿ uctuations
Although ine¢ cient ￿nancial trading only explains a limited part of the overall oil price
variability over our sample, speculative activity could still be important for understanding
the increased volatility in oil prices over the last decade, and during 2007-2008 in particular.
To assess these contributions at each point in time, it is useful to look at the historical
decomposition together with the nominal oil spot price in USD per barrel given in Figure
3. The historical decompositions are obtained from the posterior median draw.21 The
historical contributions are accumulated and expressed in percentage deviations from the
baseline unconditional forecast excluding the structural shocks. A declining contribution
is associated with a negative shock that reduces oil prices, and vice versa. For the reason
that the more recent period is of main interest, and the ￿nancialization of the commodity
markets gained momentum from 2000 on, we concentrate on the evolution of the oil price
over the period 2000:01 - 2010:02.22
In 2001, after having ￿ uctuated around USD 25 per barrel in 2000, oil prices declined
owing to a series of negative global oil demand shocks due to a slowdown in economic
activity. This decrease in oil demand can be related to the global decline in GDP growth
in 2001 in the context of the early millennium slowdown. Since early 2002, however, oil
prices surged with increasing momentum to reach about USD 120 per barrel in June 2008,
before plummeting to around USD 45 per barrel in the aftermath of the ￿nancial crisis
21We refer to Section 4.4 for the robustness of the results of the historical decomposition to this choice.
22The contributions are normalised to zero in 2000:01. The historical decomposition of the oil price and
the other variables in the model over the full sample period are available upon request.24
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1346
June 2011
which hit the global economy in the summer of 2008. Figure 3 clearly shows that the
continued increase in oil prices from 2002 till mid 2008 is mainly caused by positive oil
demand shocks driven by growing economic activity, which pushed oil prices more than
30 percent higher than the baseline projection over this period. It is well known that the
emerging economies became increasingly important as major oil importers since the early
2000s. Accordingly, strong economic growth in the emerging economies which boosted
demand for commodities in general can explain most part of the surge in oil prices over
this period.23 This rising demand came against the background of increasing tightness in
oil supply when global oil production began to stagnate in 2004, mainly due to non-OPEC
countries. Therefore, negative oil supply shocks also contributed signi￿cantly to the surge
in oil prices, causing them to be about 12 percent higher than the baseline projection
between 2003 and mid-2008. Oil-speci￿c demand shocks lifted oil prices higher by more
than 20 percent, which makes the total contribution of oil demand shocks in general clearly
dominant. Although the contribution of the oil-speci￿c demand shock is compatible with
a variety of interpretations, one possibility is increased demand for oil driven by a tighter
expected oil supply-demand balance in the future.
There is some consensus that steeply rising oil demand together with tighter oil supply
are the driving factors behind the gradual increase in oil prices since 2003 (e.g. ECB 2010).
On the factors behind the strong ￿ uctuations in the oil spot price between 2007 and the
beginning of 2010, there is less clarity. Hamilton (2009) ￿nds that it is possible to explain
the main part of the oil price run-up in 2007-2008 based on fundamentals, i.e. strong
demand confronting stagnating supply. Using a simple theoretical model, however, he
argues that speculation could have played a role as well, although fundamentals are likely
to be more important. By testing this within an empirical framework, we ￿nd similar
results for destabilizing ￿nancial activity. Figure 3 clearly shows that the considerable
rise in oil prices was due to a series of oil demand shocks driven by economic activity,
together with increasingly tighter oil supply which aggravated the upward move in oil
prices. This can be linked to the observation that the capacity utilization rate at which
OPEC was producing increased, leaving less room to absorb unexpected oil demand shocks.
Interestingly, we ￿nd that also ￿nancial trading plays an important role in explaining the
steep oil price run up in 2007-2008, and pushed oil prices about 12 percent higher than
23Also Baumeister and Peersman (2008), Hamilton (2009), Kilian (2009) and related papers ￿nd that
shocks to oil demand are mainly responsible for the continued increase in oil prices since 2003.25
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the level justi￿ed by fundamentals over the period 2007:08 - 2008:06.24 This could indeed
be associated with the relevant in￿ ows into passive exchange-traded funds linked to oil.
In the second half of 2008, oil prices dropped by 62 percent from peak to trough on
the back of a slowdown in economic activity and the onset of the ￿nancial crisis. Figure
3 indicates that this period was characterized by a substantial fall in oil demand on the
back of slowing economic activity, whereas global oil production remained tight. Again,
ine¢ cient ￿nancial trading contributed signi￿cantly to the fall in oil prices, leading to an
undershooting of more than 20 percent with respect to the baseline projection over the
period 2008:07 - 2008:12. This came against the background of massive out￿ ows from
passive index funds due to the onset of the global ￿nancial crisis which led many agents to
unwind their positions in risky assets to reduce their leverage. In the beginning of 2009,
oil demand started to increase again on the back of a recovering global economy, which
explains most part of the rise in oil prices since then.
In a nutshell, we do ￿nd that destabilizing ￿nancial shocks played a role in explain-
ing oil price ￿ uctuations over the last decade. Over the period 2000-2008, in which the
volume of crude oil derivatives traded on NYMEX quintupled, ine¢ cient activity in the
futures market pushed oil prices about 15 percent above the level justi￿ed by (current
and expected) oil fundamentals. Particularly in 2007-2008, destabilizing ￿nancial shocks
aggravated the volatility present in the oil market. However, it is clear that shocks to oil
demand and supply remain the most important determinants of oil price movements.
4.4 Robustness of the results
In this section, we assess whether the main conclusions of the paper still hold for reason-
able changes in the speci￿cation of the SVAR model. More speci￿cally, we will evaluate
whether it is still the case that the destabilizing ￿nancial shock (i) a⁄ects the oil spot price
signi￿cantly but has no real economic e⁄ects and (ii) only plays a limited role in explaining
the variability in oil futures and spot prices over our sample because oil fundamentals are
far more important. Moreover, we test whether the ine¢ cient ￿nancial trading shock (iii)
increased the volatility of oil prices over time, and caused oil spot prices to signi￿cantly
overshoot and undershoot their fundamental level in 2007-2009, although (iv) most of the
evolutions of the oil price over the last decade are explained by rising oil demand together
24In a di⁄erent econometric framework, similar results are also found by Lombardi and Mannucci (2011).26
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with increasingly tight supply.
First, the conclusions are robust to using real oil prices, di⁄erent maturities for the
futures contracts (i.e. 2, 6 and 12 months-ahead futures), the global economic activity
measure based on cargo freight rates proposed by Kilian (2009), and reasonable variation
in the number of lags for the endogenous variables in the VAR given our sample period
(9 and 18 lags). Speci￿cally, the contribution of the destabilizing ￿nancial shock over the
period 2000:01 - 2008:06 ranges between 14 and 23 percent for the di⁄erent speci￿cations
tested compared to 15 percent for our benchmark speci￿cation.25
Second, a well-know critique on the sign restriction methodology concerns the way in
which the results are summarized. For the reason that the sign restrictions methodology
does not generate a unique model, the impulse response functions are often based on the
median draw. However, Fry and Pagan (2010) demonstrate that the impulse response
functions could come from di⁄erent models, which implies that the shocks implicit in the
impulse response functions are not necessarily orthogonal. To test for this, we generate the
variance decomposition and the historical decomposition of the benchmark VAR model
based on the ￿ closest-to-median￿draw proposed by Fry and Pagan (2010), which preserves
the orthogonality between the shocks.26 The results are shown in Panel A of Figure 4 and
5. Although the overall importance of the destabilizing ￿nancial shock reduces somewhat
when using the closest-to-median draw, the main conclusions of the paper are unchanged.
However, the unique draw proposed by Fry and Pagan (2010) could still lead to the
choice of a speci￿c model which generates results that are qualitatively very di⁄erent from
those of the other models satisfying the sign restrictions. Therefore, we narrow the number
of admissible models down by imposing additional restrictions on the bounds of the short-
run price elasticity of oil supply and demand, as suggested by Kilian and Murphy (2009).
We restrict the impact price elasticity of oil supply to be lower than 0.025 and the impact
price elasticity of oil demand to lie between -0.8 and 0, similar to Kilian and Murphy
(2010). The results for the variance decomposition and the historical decomposition are
25The contribution of the destabilizing ￿nancial activity shock is 16.8, 16.9, 14.3, 14.5, 17.2, 13.9 and
22.6 for the speci￿cation with real oil prices, 2-, 6- and 12 month ahead futures, the economic activity
indicator proposed by Kilian (2009) and using 9 and 18 lags for the endogenous variables respectively.
More detailed results are available upon request from the authors.
26We only show the results for the variance decomposition and the historical decomposition as the
impulse response functions describe a range of possible outcomes which is not in violation of the Fry and
Pagan critique.27
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shown in Panel B of Figure 4 and 5. Although the variance decomposition indicates a
modest change in the relative importance among the fundamental shocks, in favor of the
oil-speci￿c demand shock, the historical decomposition shows that recent evolutions in
the oil price are still explained by rising oil demand and tightening oil supply. Moreover,
the destabilizing ￿nancial shock remains a non-negligible factor in the explanation of the
increased volatility of oil prices over time, and in 2007-2009 in particular.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we analyzed the role of ￿nancial trading in determining the price of oil over
the past two decades, with a special focus on the 2007-2009 period. As the activity of
￿nancial investors in oil futures markets can at the same time enhance and distort the
price formation mechanism in the oil market, we separated two types of activity in the
oil futures market. The ￿rst type of trading occurs on the back of fundamentals, and
therefore makes price formation in the oil markets more e¢ cient. We identi￿ed three
types of oil fundamental shocks, i.e. an oil supply shock, an oil-demand shock driven by
economic activity and an oil-speci￿c demand shock. Each shock has di⁄erent e⁄ects on
the oil spot market variables and global economic activity. The second type of activity
in the futures market occurs independently of oil fundamentals and distorts the price
signals in the oil market. We label this non-fundamental shock as a destabilizing ￿nancial
shock, and de￿ne it as a deviation from the no-arbitrage condition which captures trading
that is not consistent with movements in oil supply and demand. In our view, de￿ning
speculation in this way enables us to study the role of ￿nancial activity in the oil market
more comprehensively than the literature has done so far. Moreover, as only ￿nancial
activity that distorts e¢ cient price formation is not desirable, we argue that also this type
of trading is more relevant for policy makers and regulators. We disentangle the di⁄erent
types of oil shocks using a structural VAR model of the global oil spot and futures market
identi￿ed with sign restrictions. Several interesting conclusions emerge from our analysis.
First, we ￿nd that ￿nancial activity in the futures market can signi￿cantly a⁄ect the
spot oil price. This implies that ￿nancial trading matters, although its e⁄ect on spot oil
prices is only short-lived. Destabilizing ￿nancial shocks do not a⁄ect oil production or
inventories, and fail to have any signi￿cant real e⁄ects. The pass-through of the ￿nancial
shock in the futures markets to the oil spot market appears to be incomplete as the28
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futures-spot price permanently increases. Second, destabilizing ￿nancial shocks do not
explain much of the variability in oil prices, as shocks to oil fundamentals account for more
than 90 percent of the forecast error variance decomposition over the di⁄erent horizons.
Third, looking at speci￿c points in time over the past decade, we ￿nd that the largest
part of the gradual run-up in oil prices over the 2002-2008 period is driven by unexpected
increases in oil demand in the wake of a growing global economy, amid increasingly tight
oil supply. Stronger oil demand and tight oil supply also explain most part of the surge
in oil prices between 2007 and mid-2008, and the drop in oil prices in the second half
of 2008 is also mainly on the back of a strong fall in oil demand driven by the global
economic downturn that followed the ￿nancial crisis. As global economic activity gradually
recovered from early 2009 on, oil prices increased again due to a recovering global demand
for oil. However, ￿nancial trading also mattered over the past decade, leading oil prices to
deviate considerably from the level justi￿ed by fundamentals. In particular in 2007-2008,
destabilizing ￿nancial activity caused oil prices to respectively over- and undershoot their
fundamental values by signi￿cant amounts.
Although we propose a way to identify destabilizing activity in the futures market, and
disentangle this ￿nancial shock from innovations in oil supply and demand, capturing all
relevant ￿nancial activity in the futures markets remains a di¢ cult task. An interesting
avenue for future research is therefore to implement ￿nancial trading in the futures market
in a fully-￿ edged theoretical model, in order to better understand how speculation, and
more generally ￿nancial activity, can impact on the price of oil.29
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Appendix
Sign restrictions in practice
As mentioned in the text, we rely on the following structural VAR model to identify the
impact of the di⁄erent types of oil shocks:
Xt = c + A(L)Xt￿1 + B"t
with Xt the vector of ￿ve endogenous variables (oil price, oil production, world in-
dustrial production, oil futures price and oil inventories), c a vector of constants, A(L)
a matrix polynomial in the lag operator L and B the contemporaneous impact matrix of
the vector of orthogonalized error terms "t. In this paper, we want to estimate the e⁄ects
of four di⁄erent types of oil shocks, i.e. oil supply shock, oil demand shock driven by
economic activity, oil-speci￿c demand shock and the destabilizing ￿nancial shock. How-
ever, it is not possible to estimate the contemporaneous impact matrix B and therefore
identify the structural innovations in "t without further assumptions. In particular, since
the structural shocks are mutually orthogonal, the variance-covariance matrix of a reduced
form estimation of the VAR is ￿ = B0B. Given ￿, there are an in￿nite number of possi-
ble B. In the case of sign restrictions, a set of possible B are considered conditional on
ful￿lling a number of sign conditions. Peersman (2005) shows how to generate all possible
decompositions. To uniquely disentangle the four types of oil shocks, we implement the
sign restrictions which are explained in Section 3.2. We impose the sign restrictions to
hold for the ￿rst 12 months after the shocks, except for the response of the spread which
is only imposed contemporaneously.
As in Peersman (2005), we use a Bayesian approach for estimation and inference.
Our prior and posterior distributions of the reduced form VAR belong to the Normal-
Wishart family. To draw the "candidate truths" from the posterior, we take a joint
draw from the unrestricted Normal-Wishart posterior for the VAR parameters as well
as a random possible block lower triangular decomposition B of the variance-covariance
matrix, which allows us to construct impulse response functions. If the impulse response
functions from a particular draw satisfy the imposed sign conditions, the draw is kept.
Otherwise, the draw is rejected by giving it a zero prior weight. We require each draw
to satisfy the restrictions of all four shocks simultaneously. Note that the restrictions33
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following the destabilizing ￿nancial shock are only imposed on the futures price and the
futures-spot spread, the responses of the spot oil market variables are fully determined
by the data. A total of 1000 "successful" draws from the posterior are then used to show
the 68 percent probability range of possible impulse responses to the shocks in Figure
1, together with the median response. In general, we need 188179 draws to ￿nd 1000
successful identi￿cations, which indicates that the data is relatively in favor of the model
that generates the sign restrictions. When imposing additional sign restrictions on the
bounds of the price elasticity of oil supply and demand, in line with Kilian and Murphy
(2010), we need more than 355000 rotations for ￿nding one successful draw.34
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